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ATCA SUITS: THE BETrER ALTERNATIVE
I. INTRODUCTION

Over two decades ago, in Filartigav. Pena-Irala,Ithe United States Court
for the Second Circuit held that official acts of torture violated
Appeals
of
international law and created a cause of action under a two-hundred-year-old
2
statute, the previously rarely-invoked Alien Tort Claims Act of 1789 (ATCA).
The ATCA essentially permits a non-citizen plaintiff to sue a non-citizen
defendant for an act that occurred outside the United States, in a U.S. court:
The revolutionary decision invited further adjudication of international human
rights claims in United States courts. The federal circuit courts indeed have
progressively expanded the scope of the ATCA to encompass acts by non-state
actors,' claims by United States citizens, 5 and more recently, claims against
American corporations engaged in overseas operations. 6
The last expansion has incited the greatest controversy, and thereby is the
most relevant to a discussion of the appropriateness of international human
rights claims under the ATCA. Business groups particularly have been
concerned about the increasingly numerous claims brought against American
multinational corporations under the statute.7 Several business groups have
convened in Washington, D.C., to discuss strategies to combat the potential
ATCA litigation, ranging from proposals for legislation to submission of
amicus curiae briefs in pending ATCA cases.' Multinational corporations fear
the potential adverse consequences that ATCA suits could have on interna-

' 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2004). Scholars also refer to the ATCA as the Alien Tort Statute

2

(ATS). E.g., GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & NICHOLAS K. MrRoKoSTAs, AWAKENING MONSTER:

THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE OF 1789, at 2 n.2 (2003).
3 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2004).

4 E.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1005 (1996).
5 E.g., Estate of Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1345 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
6

E.g., Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002); Doe v. Gap, Inc., No. CV-01-

0031, 2002 WL 1000068 (D. N. Mar. I, May 10, 2002); Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470
(2d Cir. 2002); Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1345 (S.D. Fla. 2003); Estate of
Rodriguez v. Drummond Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1250 (N.D. Ala. 2003).
7 HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 2, at 1-2; see also Jim Lobe, Rights-U.S.:

AshcroftAttnempts to End Victims' Rights Law, INTER PRESS SERVICE, May 15, 2003, available
at 2003 WL 6915334 (estimating that twenty-five ATCA cases against U.S. multinational
corporations have been filed since 1993); Abid Aslam, Unocal to Be Judged Under California
Law, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2003, available at 2003 WL 60574912 (concurring that twenty-five
ATCA suits have been brought against over one hundred multinational corporations).
8 Paul Magnusson, Making a Federal Case Out of Overseas Abuses, BUS. WK., Nov. 25,
2002, at 78.
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tional trade and overseas American investments. 9 One representative
cautioned, "Multinationals are at risk whenever they operate outside their
home market. They risk entanglement with governments that are abusing their
citizens, or getting involved in situations where human rights aren't
protected."'"
In addition to the concentrated scrutiny of international business groups,
ATCA suits have attracted the attention of the executive branch. On July 29,
2002, at the request of the court, the United States Department of State
submitted a letter to the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia in an ATCA suit alleging human rights violations committed by
Exxon Mobil Corporation in Indonesia." The State Department advised the
district court to dismiss the suit on the basis that litigation potentially could
disrupt the administration's ongoing and extensive efforts to secure Indonesia's cooperation in the war against international terrorism. 2 In May 2003,
United States Attorney General John Ashcroft filed an amicus curiae brief with
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in a pending case by Burmese villagers
against California-based Unocal Corporation. 3 The Department of Justice
broadly denounced all claims under the ATCA and urged courts to dismiss all
such suits because the litigation interfered with United States foreign policy
and threatened to undermine the administration's war on terrorism.14
The increasingly vocal objections raised by international business
organizations and the George W. Bush administration demonstrate the
enormous potential of ATCA suits to affect the development of international
human rights law, the conduct of United States foreign policy, and the stability
of American international trade and investments. Recognizing the manifold

9 HUFBAUER & MrrRoKosTAs, supra note 2, at 37-43.

'o Murray Hiebert, Unocal Case Puts Focus on Firms Engaged in Asia, WALL ST.J. EUR.,
July 9,2002, at A4 (quoting Stephen Davis, editor of Global Proxy Watch, a weekly newsletter
on international corporate governance).
" Daphne Eviatar, Profitsat Gunpoint: Unocal's Pipeline in Burma Becomes a Test Case
in CorporateAccountability, THE NATION, June 30, 2003, at 16; HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS,
supra note 2, at 71.
2 Eviatar, supranote 11. The State Department letter specifically warned that ATCA suits
could have "a potentially serious adverse impact on significant interests of the United States,
including interests related directly to the on-going struggle against international terrorism."
HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supranote 2, at 71 (quoting letter from William H. Taft IV, Legal
Advisor to the U.S. Dep't of State, to the U.S. District of Columbia District Court (July 29,
2002)).
13 Eviatar, supra note 11.
14

Id.
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possible uses and abuses of the statute, international law scholars have
promulgated extensive analyses of the advantages and disadvantages of human
rights litigation under the ATCA.' 5
In the domestic sphere, the predominant issue involves the extent to which
constitutional and justiciability principles counsel against facilitation of the
statute. Opponents emphasize the separation of powers,' 6 act of state,1"
political question, 1" and forum non conveniens doctrines, 9 in an effort to
negate the judiciary's authority to decide ATCA claims. They contend that
resolution of international human rights violations should be determined by the
political branches2 ° or the domestic courts of the states in which the violations
occurred.2

'" See, e.g., Cynthia R.L. Fairweather, Obstacles to Enforcing InternationalHuman Rights
Law in Domestic Courts, 4U.C. DAvIS J. INT'LL. &PoL'Y 119 (1998) (analyzingthe difficulties
of litigating international human rights claims in United States courts); Beth Stephens,
Translating Filartiga:A Comparative and InternationalLaw Analysis of Domestic Remedies
for International Human Rights Violations, 27 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (2002) (examining the
different legal systems employed in the United States and Europe to suggest that unique
characteristics of the American system permit litigation of international human rights claims
under the ATCA); Eric Gruzen, Comment, The United States as a Forumfor Human Rights
Litigation: Is This the Best Solution?, 14 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 207 (2001) (arguing that
international human rights claims should not be litigated in United States courts); Michael
Dwayne Pettyjohn, Comment, BringMe Your Tired, Your Poor, YourEgregiousTorts Yearning
to See Green: The Alien Tort Statute, 10 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 513 (2003) (offering a
general overview of ATCA claims).
16 Demian Betz, HoldingMultinationalCorporationsResponsibleforHumanRights Abuses
Committed by Security Forces in Conflict-Ridden Nations: An Argument Against Exporting
FederalJurisdictionfor the Purpose of Regulating Corporate BehaviorAbroad, 14 DEPAUL
Bus. L.J. 163, 179-80 (2001); Brian C. Free, Comment, Awaiting Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp.:
Advocating the Cautious Use of Executive Opinions in Alien Tort ClaimsAct Litigation, 12 PAC.
RIM L. & PoL'Y J. 467, 480-89 (2003).
17 Betz, supra note 16, at 181-82; Free, supra note 16, at 489-97.
'8 Betz, supra note 16, at 181-82; Free, supra note 16, at 489-97.
19 Courtney Shaw, Note, UncertainJustice: Liabilityof MultinationalsUnderthe Alien tort
Claims Act, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1359, 1361, 1385 (2002).
20 Betz, supra note 16, at 186 (arguing that ATCA suits threaten to interfere with foreign
policy decisions of the political branches); Free, supranote 16 (contending that ATCA suits raise
nonjusticiable political questions).
" E.g., Fairweather, supra note 15 (asserting that adjudication of international human rights
in domestic courts may intrude upon the sovereignty of other nations). But see Kathryn Lee
Boyd, The Inconvenience of Victims: Abolishing Forum Non Conveniens in U.S. Human Rights
Litigation,39 VA. J. INT'LL. 41, 86 (1998) (urging that forum non conveniens should not apply
to international human rights claims).
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In the international sphere, the primary issue concerns the extent to which
international law permits U.S. courts to assert jurisdiction over a case
involving non-citizen parties for an act that occurred in the territory of another
sovereign state. In their most basic forms, the domestic and international
issues are identical: at what point does the adjudication of international human
rights claims by U.S. courts interfere with the power of equivalent authorities--executive and legislative branches, other sovereign states, and international human rights tribunals?
Scholars have conducted extensive analyses of the impact of ATCA claims
on the authority of the political branches22 and on the sovereignty of affected
states.23 Despite convenient proposals for dismissal of the ATCA claims,
opponents fail to offer a viable alternative for the resolution of human rights
violations. Delegation of human rights protection to the political branches or
to the domestic courts of other sovereign states likewise faces impediments to
successful resolution.
Although the political branches could implement a diplomatic plan for the
prevention of future acts and provide some reparation for past acts, each
plaintiff would surrender individual compensation and closure. Moreover,
because ATCA claims frequently implicate actions by the governments of the
states in which the human rights violations occurred,24 adjudication of such
claims by the states' domestic courts likely would prove unsuccessful. In
ATCA suits against American multinational corporations, a judgment issued
by the domestic courts of another state also may be difficult to enforce in the
United States.
Similarly, utilization of international human rights tribunals to afford a
remedy for human rights violations may prove a weak alternative to the ATCA.
The tribunals admittedly could offer a more neutral decision-maker than
domestic courts. Their decisions also are more likely to enjoy acceptance by
the international community, thereby affording greater legitimacy to any
judgment and increasing the chances of the parties' satisfaction and compliance. However, an analysis of the principles and practices of the two most
established international human rights tribunals, the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR),
nevertheless indicates that the regional tribunals constitute a weak substitute
to the ATCA. This Note will argue that the structure of the regional tribunals,

E.g., Betz, supra note 16; Free, supra note 16.
E.g., Fairweather, supra note 15.
24 See infra Part HA.

22

23
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as well as their self-imposed deference to the decisions of domestic courts,
operate as a disincentive to the adjudication of human rights claims before
such tribunals when a domestic alternative exists. Furthermore, the principle
of subsidiarity, the margin of appreciation doctrine, and the fourth instance
formula specifically promote the adjudication of human rights claims in a
domestic court before the filing of a complaint before a regional tribunal.
Particularly in ATCA suits against American multinational corporations, for
which another domestic venue may be unavailable, adjudication of human
rights claims in U.S. courts may be an appropriate and necessary exercise of
the judiciary power.
In order to better familiarize the reader with the ATCA, the ECHR, and the
IACHR, this Note first will provide a brief background of the development of
cases under the ATCA, as well as the basic structures and procedures of the
ECHR and IACHR. Second, the Note will examine the ECHR and IACHR's
use of the principle of subsidiarity, the margin of appreciation doctrine, and the
fourth instance formula. Finally, this Note will analyze the theories' effects
on international human rights law and ultimately conclude that the deference
imposed by the theories supports rather than discourages the adjudication of
human rights violations in U.S. courts under the ATCA. Thus, this Note
primarily will focus on the rationales against resorting to the ECHR and the
IACHR in explaining why the regional tribunals offer poor alternatives to use
of the ATCA in U.S. courts.

I.BACKGROUND
A. Alien Tort Claims Act
Originally enacted as part of the first congressional statute on thejudiciary,
the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) simply states, "The district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."26
According to the plain language of the statute, a plaintiff asserting a claim
under the ATCA must prove three elements: (1) a civil suit for a tort only; (2)
Due to space constraints, this Note will not examine the advantages and disadvantages of
U.S. courts asserting jurisdiction over ATCA claims, an issue which has been discussed in other
works. See, e.g., Gruzen, supra note 15; Stephens, supra note 15; Fairweather, supra note 15;
Pettyjohn, supra note 15.
26 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2004) (corresponding to the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9(b),
1
Stat. 73, 77).
25
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brought by an alien plaintiff; and (3) committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States.
The statute lacks a congressional record by which to determine legislative
intent, and despite the deceptively simple language, judges and legal scholars
have maintained an ongoing debate concerning the intended scope and purpose
of the ATCA.27 Some scholars contend that Congress intended the ATCA to
apply only to claims arising from the law of prize, which governs the right to
intercept enemy merchant vessels during wartime.2" Other scholars propose
to restrict the application of the ATCA to violations of international law
recognized in 1789, primarily claims arising from the law of prize, assaults
against ambassadors, and acts of piracy.29
For almost 200 years, however, litigants generally avoided filing claims
under the statute.3" Then, in 1979, Dr. Filartiga, a Paraguayan doctor and
political activist, and his daughter, Dolly Filartiga, invoked the ATCA on
behalf of Joelito Filartiga, a victim of alleged human rights abuses ordered by
Americo Norberto Pena-Irala, then Inspector General of Police in Asuncion,
Paraguay.3 Neither plaintiffs nor defendant were citizens of the United States;
nor did the alleged human rights violations occur in the United States.32 The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals nevertheless accepted jurisdiction, and
ultimately held in favor of the plaintiffs.3 3 The decision initiated the
controversial use of the ATCA to permit adjudication of international human
rights claims in United States courts.
Subsequent decisions indeed have further expanded the scope of the
ATCA, and claims may be divided into three basic categories. In the first
27 See

generally Gruzen, supra note 15, at 210 (describing various arguments presented by

legal scholars concerning the intended scope and purpose of the ATCA).
'8 E.g., Joseph Modeste Sweeney, A Tort Only In Violation of the Law of Nations, 18

HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 445,451 (1995).
29 E.g., William S. Dodge, The Historical Originsof the Alien Tort Statute: A Response to

the "Originalists," 19 HASTINGS INT'L&CoMP. L. REV. 221,232-33 (1996); William R. Casto,

The Federal Courts' Protective JurisdictionOver Torts Committed in Violation of the Law of
Nations, 18 CoNN. L. REV. 467, 495 (1986).
" See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 (1980). According to the Second Circuit,

only two decisions previously afforded jurisdiction under the ATCA. Id. 887 n.21. The cases
are Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961) and Bolchos v. Darrell,3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C.
1795). Id.; see also David P. Kunstle, Note, Kadic v. Karadzic: Do PrivateIndividuals Have
EnforceableRights andObligationsUndertheAlien Tort ClaimsAct?, 6 DUKEJ. COMP. & INT'L

L. 319, 326-29 (1996) (summarizing early ATCA cases).
"' Filartiga,630 F.2d at 878.
32

id.

33 id.
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category, cases parallel original ATCA litigation: an alien plaintiff sues a state
actor such as a foreign government or its officials for human rights violations
that have occurred in the foreign state. 34 Additional litigation under the ATCA
gave rise to a second category of claims, in which an alien plaintiff sues an
alien non-state actor for human rights violations that have occurred in the
foreign state.35 Recent ATCA claims have led to the introduction of a third
category. In this third category of ATCA clams, an alien plaintiff sues a
multinational corporation for human rights violations that, typically, have been
committed by the security forces of host governments but with the knowledge
and complicity of the corporation.36 This Note briefly will review selected
cases within each category to provide the reader with an outline of the basic
scope and uses of the ATCA.

3 E.g., Filartiga,630 F.2d 876 (Paraguayan citizens sued former Paraguayan police officer
for human rights violations that occurred in Paraguay); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726
F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Israeli citizens sued Libyan Arabic Republic, Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) and other groups for PLO attack in Israel); Tachioni v. Mugabe, 234 F.
Supp. 2d 401 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (Zimbabwe citizens sued Zimbabwe government officials for
human rights violations that occurred in Zimbabwe).
3' E.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1005 (1996)
(holding that "certain forms of conduct violate the law of nations whether undertaken by those
acting under the auspices of a state or only as private individuals"). The second category of
ATCA claims also implicated human rights violations by multinational corporations. E.g.,
Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424 (D.N.J. 1999) (German plaintiff sued defendant
for use of slave labor during World War II); Bano v. Union Carbide Corp., 273 F.3d 120 (2d Cir.
2001) (Indian citizens sued defendant for toxic gas explosion in India); Deutsch v. Turner Corp.,
317 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. 2003) (foreign plaintiffs sued defendant for use of slave labor during
World War II).
36E.g., Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citizens of Ecuador
sued defendant for human rights and environmental abuses in Ecuador); Beanal v. FreeportMcMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999) (Indonesian citizen sued defendant for human
rights violations committed in concert with the Indonesian government); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000) (Nigerian citizens sued defendant for participating
in human rights crimes committed by Nigerian military government); Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co.,
239 F.3d 440 (2d Cir. 2001) (Egyptian citizens sued defendant for purchasing or leasing
plaintiffs' property, which was seized by Egyptian government); Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F.
Supp. 2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (citizens of Papua New Guinea (PNG) sued defendant for
human rights and environmental abuses committed in complicity with PNG government);
Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1345 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (Colombian plaintiffs sued
defendant holding them jointly and severally liable for human rights crimes committed by
paramilitary units); Estate of Rodriguez v. Drummond Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1250 (N.D. Ala.
2003) (Colombian plaintiffs sued defendant for alleged role in human rights violations
committed by paramilitary security forces).
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1. Category One: State Actors
As previously mentioned, Filartiga represented the first successful
invocation of the ATCA. Dr. Filartiga initially had attempted to prosecute
Pena-Irala in Paraguay, and indeed had filed a criminal action in Paraguayan
courts. 37 However, Pena-Irala allegedly threatened Dr. Filartiga's attorney
with death, and the attorney subsequently was disbarred, allegedly withoutjust
cause.38 Dolly Filartiga subsequently sued Pena-Irala under the ATCA in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, seeking
compensatory and punitive damages of $10 million.39
The district court held that the court could not review a foreign state's
treatment of its own citizens and dismissed the claim for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.40 In 1980, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, the first appellate court to interpret the ATCA, reversed the decision
of the district court. The Second Circuit held that the ATCA conferred
jurisdiction to federal courts to hear claims brought by aliens against a
defendant because intentional "torture perpetrated under color" of official
authority violates international law."' The Second Circuit broadly defined the
"law of nations," stating, "[C]ourts must interpret international law not as it
was in 1789, but as it has evolved and exists among the nations of the world
today."42 The court then examined contemporary sources of customary
international law and concluded that the law of nations prohibits official
torture.43
The Filartigadecision represented the first time a federal circuit court held
that a plaintiff could litigate international human rights violations against a
foreign state actor in a domestic court, even though the alleged offenses
occurred in a foreign state and neither party was an American citizen. The
claim essentially had no connection to the United States, either by the act

37Filartiga,630 F.2d at 878.
38 id.
" Id. at 879. In July 1978, Pena-Irala visited the United States. When he exceeded the term
of his visa, Dolly, who was then living in Washington, D.C., reported him to the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS). Id. at 878-79. As a result of Dolly's efforts, Pena-Irala was
served with a civil complaint and summons while being held at the Brooklyn Naval Yard, facing
deportation.
4o Id. at 878-80.
41 ld. at 878
42 Id. at 881.
41 id. at 884.
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creating the tort or by the direct damages caused by the act. Moreover, by
defining the law of nations to include "modem" customary international law
and "modem" views of international human rights, the decision invited other
similar claims.
The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits similarly have been receptive of human
rights claims brought under the ATCA. For example, the Ninth Circuit
44
decided In re Estate of FerdinandE. Marcos Human Rights Litigation, and
ultimately concluded that Imee Marcos-Manotoc, the daughter of former
Philippine president Ferdinand Marcos and the head of the Philippine police
during the Marcos regime, could be held liable for the torture and murder of
46
45
a Philippine citizen under the ATCA. Similarly, in Abebe-Jira v. Negewo,
the Eleventh Circuit upheld a district court's finding that an Ethiopian
defendant was liable under the ATCA for acts of torture he committed while
employed by Ethiopia's military dictatorship.47
The United States Supreme Court has decided only one case under the
ATCA. In Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.,48 the
Supreme Court dismissed the Liberian corporation's claims against the
Argentine Republic for destruction of an oil tanker on the high seas in
violation of international law.49 The Court held that the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act (FSIA) provided the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over
a foreign state, and no exception to foreign sovereign immunity applied to give
the district court jurisdiction over the Argentine Republic.50
Thus, the federal courts themselves have offered mixed interpretations of
the permissive uses of the ATCA in allowing adjudication of international
human rights claims in United States courts. Moreover, the decision by the
United States Supreme Court has not resolved the controversy, as plaintiffs
have continued to bring ATCA suits against foreign state actors.
2. CategoryTwo: Non-State Actors
The Second Circuit seized the opportunity to further expand the scope of
the ATCA in 1995. The court extended ATCA's reach to claims against
44 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992).
45

Id.

46 72 F.3d 844 (1 1th Cir. 1996).
47 id.
48 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
49 id.

50 Id.
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foreign non-state actors.5 Croatian and Muslim citizens of Bosnia sued
Radovan Karadzic, president of the self-proclaimed Bosnian Serb Republika
Srpska 2 The plaintiffs alleged that Karadzic, who commanded the BosnianSerb military forces, had ordered a series of atrocities against the Croatian and
Muslim populations, including rape, forced prostitution, torture, and summary
execution. 3 The acts allegedly comprised a campaign of genocide conducted
in the course of the Bosnian civil war.54
According to the district court, a non-state actor could not violate the law
of nations. 5 The court concluded that Karadzic was a non-state actor because
neither the Bosnian-Serb military faction nor the self-proclaimed nation of
Srpska constituted a recognized state; the court consequently dismissed the
claim.56 The Second Circuit again reversed.
The court held that the law of nations, as defined in the modem era, is not
confined to state action; in certain circumstances, private individuals as well
as nations can violate international law. 57 The court then examined established
sources of customary international law and concluded that the torts of genocide
and war crimes could be committed by state or non-state actors. 8 In order for
a non-state actor to be liable for the tort of torture, the court held that
international law generally required a finding that the actor had acted under
color of state law.59 However, if torture was conducted pursuant to a policy of
"ethnic cleansing," it could be viewed as a component of genocide or war
crimes, and a non-state actor could be held liable.6' Moreover, statehood did
not require official recognition by other sovereign powers. 61 In sum, the
significance of Kadiclay in its holding that, in certain circumstances, non-state
actors could violate the law of nations and that statehood did not require
official recognition. The decision effectively created a second category of
ATCA claims-suits by alien plaintiffs against private actors.

51 Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 244-45 (2d Cir. 1995).
52

Id. at 236.

53 Id. at 237.
5 Id.
51 Id. at 239.
56

id.

57

id.

5' Id. at 241-43.
" Id. at 243.
60

Id. at 244.

61 Id. at 244-45.

2005]

ATCA SUITS: THE BETTER ALTERNATIVE

479

Despite the Second Circuit's expansive interpretations of the scope and
purpose of the ATCA, other federal courts have offered mixed responses. The
District of Columbia Circuit Court particularly has promulgated a restrictive
interpretation of the ATCA. In Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 62 the court
dismissed the claims brought by survivors of those killed by the Palestinian
Liberation Organization (PLO) during an attack on a civilian bus in Israel in
1978.63 Each judge wrote a separate and lengthy concurrence regarding the
inappropriateness of suits under the ATCA, and offered various arguments for
dismissal of such suits. 6
3. Category Three: MultinationalCorporations
More recently, plaintiffs have begun to assert human rights claims under
the ATCA against multinational corporations with headquarters in the United
States. 65 Perhaps most prominent is the pending claim against Unocal
Corporation.66 Moreover, the facts alleged are representative of the typical
ATCA case against multinational corporations. 67 Therefore, this case deserves
detailed treatment.
In 1991, several international companies, including Unocal and the French
corporation Total S.A. (now TotalFinaElf), began negotiating plans for oil and
gas exploration with the Burmese State Law and Order Restoration Council
(SLORC). 6' The SLORC had imposed military law in Burma and renamed the
62 726 F.2d 774 (1984).
63

Id. at 775.

' Observing that the PLO was a non-state actor, Judge Edwards argued that, excluding
certain exceptions such as piracy and slave trading, the ATCA only afforded standing in claims

against state actors. Id. at 791-96. Judge Robb contended that the political question doctrine
precluded adjudication of the claim. Id. at 823-27. Judge Bork presented the most restrictive
interpretation, asserting that the ATCA conferred jurisdiction, but not a cause of action. Id. at

801-05. Moreover, Judge Bork believed that the scope of the ATCA should be confined to its
original purposes of combating piracy and protecting ambassadors. Id. at 796.
65 The most publicized cases have included claims against Texaco, Unocal, Exxon Mobil,

The Gap, Drummond, and the bottlers of Coca-Cola. Eviatar, supra note 11.
66 Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 232 (9th Cir. 2002).
67 Multinational energy companies particularly are vulnerable to suits alleging overseas

human rights violations. Shaw, supra note 19, at 1360. The resources sought by such
companies often are found in developing countries. Id. Extraction of the resources further
require extensive construction of infrastructure, as well as hard labor and dislocation of local

populations. Id. Finally, such companies frequently utilize the military and paramilitary forces
of the host government to provide security for their projects. Id.
68 Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d at 937.
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nation "Myanmar" in 1988.69 The parties subsequently entered into a joint
venture with the Burmese government that would establish the Yadana gas
pipeline project.7" The pipeline would transport large quantities of natural gas
and oil from the offshore Yadana field in the Andaman Sea eastward to
Thailand.7 The pipeline necessarily would pass through Tenasserim, a region
dominated by ethnic groups opposed to the military rule of the SLORC.72
Because of the risk of sabotage by the resident population of Tenasserim,
SLORC agreed to clear forest, level ground,
and provide labor, materials, and
73
project.
pipeline
Yadana
the
for
security
The plaintiffs, villagers who resided in the Tenasserim region, alleged that
SLORC, with the knowledge and acquiescence of Unocal, subjected them to
forced labor.74 The plaintiffs testified that, in furtherance of this forced labor
program, SLORC committed numerous acts of murder, rape, and torture.75 The
military also forcibly relocated the villagers who had lived along the pipeline.76
Interestingly, the plaintiffs did not claim that Unocal directly engaged in the
tortuous conduct; rather, they contended that Unocal 77should be jointly or
vicariously liable for the acts of the Myanmar military.
A three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit applied international law and
concluded that an issue of fact remained as to whether Unocal had aided and
abetted the Myanmar military in the conduct of human rights violations,
thereby precluding summary judgment.78 Upon a majority vote of the nonrecused regular active judges of the circuit, however, an en banc court
reviewed the decision of the three-judge panel. 79 The United States Department of Justice has intervened, filing an amicus curiae brief.80 The brief not
only urged the dismissal of the claim against Unocal; it contended that all
pending cases under the ATCA should be dismissed because they threaten to
disrupt the administration's ongoing war on terrorism."'
69

id.

70 Id. at 937-38.
71 id.

72 See id. at 938.
73 See id.
74 Id. at 939-40.
71 Id. at 939.
76

See id. at 942-43.

77 See id. at 939.
78 Id. at 944-63.
79 Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. filed Feb. 14, 2003).
80 Eviatar, supra note 11.

81Id.
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In a surprising turn of events, however, Unocal settled with the plaintiffs
on December 13, 2004.82 Although the amount of the settlement has not been
disclosed, commentators speculate that it likely was a large amount.83
Moreover, even though the Ninth Circuit consequently dismissed the case upon
rehearing en banc, 84 the fact that Unocal decided to settle demonstrates that
suits under the ATCA can result in real compensation for victims of international human rights abuses. The settlement additionally may have major
implications for the behavior of other multinational corporations.8
B. InternationalHuman Rights Tribunals
In consideration of the manifold obstacles and substantial opposition
encountered by a plaintiff in an ATCA suit, is adjudication of international
human rights claims in United States courts appropriate or even advisable? If
plaintiffs should be prohibited from seeking resolution of their human rights
claims under the ATCA, what other avenue of relief is available to them? The
international human rights tribunals generally have been recognized as
legitimate mechanisms for judicial resolution of international human rights
claims. The ECHR and the IACHR, as the oldest and most established
regional human rights tribunals, provide a basic source of comparison in
determining the effectiveness of human rights adjudication under the ATCA.
Notably, the majority of the plaintiffs in ATCA cases against U.S.-based
multinational corporations are nationals of developing countries in Central and
Latin America, Africa, and Asia.86 Asia has not established a successful
human rights system, and Africa only recently has developed a system. 87 The

8 Associated Press, Unocal to Settle Human Rights Lawsuits (Dec. 13, 2004), http://www.

msnbc.msn.com/id/6705737.
" See id.; see also James P. Pinkerton, Trial Lawyers Finding a Haven Overseas, JEWISH

WORLD REViEw (Dec. 22, 2004), http://www.jewishworldreview.com/1204/pinkerton122204.
php3?printer-friendly.
8 Doe v. Unocal Corp., Nos. 00-56603,00-57197,00-56628,00-57195,2005 WL 843914,
at *1 (9th Cir. Apr. 13, 2005) (en banc).
85 See Paul Chavez, Tentative Unocal Deal Could Alter the Behavior of Multinationals,

AssociATED PREss (Dec. 19, 2004), http:llwww.mercurynews.comlmldlmercurynews/newsl
local/states/california/norther-california/10454866.htm.
86See, e.g., cases cited supra note 36.
87 The

African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights was established by the African

Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, art. 30, adopted June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58, 63-64

(entered into force Oct. 21, 1986), availableat http:l/www.achpr.orglenglishl/info/charter-en.
html. The African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights was established by the Protocol to the
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European system, although successful, cannot accept claims outside its
region."8 The Inter-American human rights system thereby remains the only
practical regional tribunal open to most plaintiffs in ATCA cases. Nevertheless, because the European system has endured the longest, and greatly
influences the Inter-American system, this Note will examine both systems.
1. The EuropeanSystem of Human Rights
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention), the first regional human rights
treaty to enter into force, was signed in Rome in November 1950.89 The
European Convention codified the fundamental human rights that member
states agreed to protect. 90 The Convention also created the European
Commission on Human Rights (European Commission) and the European
Court of Human Rights (ECHR), 9'' 92"the oldest international court in the field
of the protection of human rights.
The European Commission initially reviewed complaints of violations of
the human rights guaranteed in the European Convention.93 The European
Commission first determined whether a complaint was admissible. Once the
European Commission had decided that a complaint was admissible, the
Commission then investigated the merits of the claim and prepared a summary
of its recommendations, which was forwarded to the ECHR.94
The ECHR could only decide claims that had been referred to it by the
European Commission, a state party, or an individual applicant who had first
filed a complaint with the European Commission. 9 The ECHR primarily

African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on
Human and Peoples' Rights, OAU Doc. OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT (HI), art. 27(2) (June

9, 1998), availableat http:Ilwww.achpr.orglenglishlinfofcourt.en.htmt.
88 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
openedfor signatureNov. 4, 1950, arts. 33-34, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 242 [hereinafter European

Convention].
89 Jean-Paul Costa, The EuropeanCourt of Human Rights and Its Recent Case Law, 38 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 455, 455 (2003).

' European Convention, supra note 88, arts. 2-18, 213 U.N.T.S. at 226-34.
91Id. art. 19, 213 U.N.T.S. at 234.
92 Costa, supra note 89, at 455.

9'European Convention, supra note 88, art. 24, 213 U.N.T.S. at 234.
94Id. art. 31, 213 U.N.T.S. at 240.
9'Id. arts. 33, 34, 213 U.N.T.S. at 242; see also Posting of Edwin Rekosh, owner-

piln@columbia.edu, to piln@law.columbia.edu (Nov. 4, 1998), http://www.pili.org/lists/piln/
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interpreted and applied the substantive provisions of the European Convention
to a particular claim in order to determine whether a violation had occurred.9 6
In making that determination, the ECHR typically reviewed the written
proceedings.97 The oral proceedings consisted of arguments by the European
Commission, the applicant's legal representative, and the respondent state's
legal representative. 98 At the request of one of the parties, the ECHR further
could hear the testimony of witnesses and experts. 99
Moreover, although the reports of the European Commission were not
binding on the ECHR, they generally had strong persuasive authority.' 0 The
ECHR usually accepted the findings and recommendations of the European
Commission.'
The judgments of the ECHR further were binding and
obligated the member states which were parties to the case."2 With the recent
entry into force of Protocol 11, however, the European Commission and the
ECHR have merged into a single entity, combining their previous functions.'0 3
2. The Inter-American System of Human Rights
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Inter-American
Commission) developed in 1959, without a convention.'O° It applied the
American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man (American Declaration). ' 5 The Americas' equivalent of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the American Declaration was adopted in May 1948 simultaneously
with the creation of the Organization of American States (OAS). 6

archives/msg00239.html..
96

European Convention, supra note 88, art. 45, 213 U.N.T.S. at 246.

97

See

DONNA GOMIEN ET AL., LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION OF

HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER 11, at 78 (1996) (describing the general
procedure for oral argument).
98 Id.

99Id.
Id.

100

101 Id.
02 European
103

Convention, supra note 88, art. 53, 213 U.N.T.S. at 248.

Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental

Freedoms, May 11, 1994, art. 19, Europ. T.S. No. 155 (entered into force Nov. 1, 1998).
" Christina M. Cema, The Inter-AmericanSystem for the Protectionof Human Rights, 95
AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 75, 75 (2001).
105

id.

106

id.
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The Inter-American Commission primarily addressed "gross and system-7
0
atic" violations of human rights in North, Central, and South America.1
Because several states in the region, specifically in Central and South America,
existed under military dictatorships, the Commission particularly concentrated
on the delegitimization of those dictatorships.0 8 Accordingly, the Commission
conducted onsite investigations and issued reports on large-scale violations,
such as the systematic practice of torture or forced disappearances."" The
Commission further presented annual reports to the OAS General Assembly,
which encouraged intense political debates and directed public attention to
human rights violations in the region. "0
Additionally, the Inter-American Commission's duties included the
stimulation of an awareness of human rights among pan-American countries,
the formulation of recommendations to governments for the adoption of
progressive measures, the preparation of studies, the request of reports from
governments on adopted human rights measures, and service as an advisory
body on human rights for the OAS."'
In 1965, the OAS increased the responsibilities of the Inter-American
Commission to receive both communications and individual petitions."I2 Two
years later, an amendment to the OAS Charter made the Inter-American
Commission a principal organ of the OAS." 3 As the responsibilities of the
Inter-American Commission expanded, the OAS observed a need for a
fundamental change within the Inter-American human rights system." 4
During an OAS conference in 1948, the member states agreed that the
protection of human rights "should be guaranteed by a juridical organ, in as
much as no right is genuinely assured unless it is safeguarded by a competent
court. ' 1 The states further observed that, "where internationally recognized
rights are concerned, juridical protection, to be effective, should emanate from
' 16
an international organ." "
''7 Id. at 76.
'0oId. at 76.
109Id.

I10 Id.
.. Id. at 78.
112 id.
113

Id.

114 id.
115 Ninth InternationalConference ofAmerican States, Final Act XXXJ, in INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCES OF AMERICAN STATES, SECOND SUPPLEMENT, 1942-1954, at 270 (Pan American
Union ed., 1958).
116 Id.
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On November 22, 1969, the OAS completed the American Convention on
Human Rights in San Jose, Costa Rica.' 17 The American Convention entered
into force on July 18, 1978. ' The Inter-American system of human rights,
which previously had relied on instruments of a declarative nature, now was
based on concrete instruments and bodies: the American Convention, the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights, and the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights (IACHR)." 9
The American Convention describes the substantive civil and political
rights that member states have agreed to guarantee to protect. 2 ° The
enactment of the Convention introduced a dual structure. One system
encompassed the countries that had not ratified the American Convention but
that had recognized the American Declaration.' 2 ' Such countries include the
United States and Canada. 122 A second system had involved the countries that
ratified the American Convention. These countries were protected by two
mechanisms: the Inter-American Commission and the IACHR. 23 For a matter
to be considered by the IACHR, a country must have ratified the American
24
Convention and have accepted the contentious jurisdiction of the IACHR.
Thus, the American Convention created the Inter-American Commission
and the IACHR."2 ' Composed of seven members, the Inter-American
Commission investigates allegations of human rights violations. 26 The
Commission primarily prepares reports on the general state of human rights in
member states and investigates petitions by individuals claiming human rights
violations. 127 The Inter-American Commission first determines the admissibil-

"'
118

Cerna, supra note 104, at 79.
Id.

see also Dinah L. Shelton, Improving Human Rights Protections:Recommendations
for Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Inter-American Commission and the Inter-American
Court ofHuman Rights, 3 AM. U. J. INT'LL. & POL'Y323 (1988) (describing the Inter-American
human rights system).
120 American Convention on Human Rights, openedforsignature Nov. 22, 1969, arts. 1-25,
1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 143-51 (entered into force July 18, 1978) [hereinafter American
Convention].
121 Cema, supra note 104, at 80.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 American Convention, supra note 120, arts. 33-73, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 153-61 (establishing
the Inter-American Commission and the IACHR and delineating their respective compositions,
functions, and procedures).
119 Id.;

126

Id.

127

Id. art. 41, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 154-55 (stating the major functions of the Inter-American
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ity of the petition. 2 8 It then may investigate the claims, prepare a summary of
29
its recommendations, and ultimately forward the summary to the IACHR.1
The IACHR, composed of seven judges, interprets the rights established in
the American Convention and determines whether a violation has occurred. 3 '
The IACHR initially considered cases primarily on an advisory basis.'31 In
April 1986, the Commission forwarded three contentious cases to the IACHR,
court. 3 2 The decisions
thereby establishing the IACHR's authority as a trial
133
of the IACHR are binding on the member states.
Although twenty-six states are signatories to the American Convention,
only sixteen of those have accepted the jurisdiction of the IACHR. 13 4 The
American Convention requires member states to comply with judgments of the
IACHR in cases to which the state is a party. 135 The Convention does not,
however, provide a formal procedure by which to enforce the rulings of the
IACHR.' 36 Ultimately, the effectiveness of the American Convention and of
decisions by the IACHR depends upon both the willingness of Member States
to consent to the IACHR'37s jurisdiction and the member states' enforcement of
the IACHR's decisions.'
I.

ANALYSIS

As plaintiffs more frequently invoke the ATCA and the federal circuit
courts progressively expand its scope, the controversial nature of the statute
becomes increasingly evident. Nevertheless, an analysis of the structures and
procedures of the regional tribunals suggests that adjudication of human rights
violations under the ATCA may be appropriate and even necessary.

Commission).

28 Id. art. 46, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 155.

29 Id. arts. 48-51, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 156-57.
130 Id. art. 63, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 159.
131Cerna, supra note 104, at 76.
132 Id. at 76-77.
133Id. at 77-78.
'34 Edward D. Re, International Judicial Tribunals and the Courts of the Americas: A
Comment with Emphasis on Human Rights Law, 40 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1091, 1097 (1996).
3s
136

American Convention, supra note 120, art. 68, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 160.
id.

137Re, supra note 134, at 1096-97.
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A. ProceduralComparisonof Regional Tribunal Claims to ATCA Claims
1. Backlog
The regional tribunals each face a massive backlog in caseload and they
continue to receive thousands of complaints annually. In 2001, the ECHR
delivered 800 judgments,'3 8 as well as 8000 to 9000 decisions dismissing
applications as inadmissible. 39 Despite the large number of judgments, the
ECHR still faces a massive backlog; in 2001, complainants filed more than
13,000 new applications.'40 Thus, the ECHR must resolve the dual problems
of stopping the increase in applications, as it simultaneously struggles to
reduce the massive backlog in cases.' 4' Due to the expansive caseload and
substantial backlog, a complainant who files an application with the ECHR
may expect to wait several years for a judgment in his case.
2. ProlongedAdjudication
Although the Inter-American system does not have as large of a caseload
as the European system,' 42 the structure of charge processing in the InterAmerican system may cause delays in the adjudication of a claim. First, the
American Convention requires each applicant to exhaust domestic remedies
before he presents his case to the IACHR. 13 Second, before the applicant may
approach the IACHR, he must present his case before the Inter-American
Commission, which may take an average of three or four years to completely
process a claim."44 Then, if the Commission concludes that the case should be
presented to the IACHR, the IACHR itself may take an additional four years
to hear and resolve the case.'4 5 One scholar bemoans the system, stating, "The
delay to resolve the demands of human rights abuses, the duplicity of
processes, the loss of evidence, and the anguish of having to relive often

138Costa, supra
139id.
140id.
141

note 89, at 456.

Id.

142Cerna, supra note 104, at 76.
141Victor Rodriguez Rescia & Marc David Seitles, The Development of the Inter-American
Human Rights System: A Historical Perspectiveand a Modem-Day Critique, 16 N.Y.L. SCH.
J.Hum. RTS. 593, 622-23 (2000).
144
id.
145 Id.

GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 33:467

horrific events after eight or ten years contradicts the purpose of a system
which seeks to emotionally and economically compensate victims.' '4 6 Under
both the ECHR and the IACHR, a complainant may have to wait several years,
if not a decade, in order to receive a resolution of his claim.
Notably, however, the length of adjudication in United States courts under
the ATCA may not necessarily be more expedient. For example, the plaintiffs
in the Unocal'47 case did not receive resolution of their claims until 2005, even
though they filed suit in 1996.148 Plaintiffs in domestic and regional tribunals
therefore may wait almost a decade before they receive a final decision. On
the other hand, adjudication of claims under the ATCA does not impose any
conditions on the filing of a suit; thus the total amount of time for a plaintiff
in a United States domestic court would be approximately a decade. The
ECHR and the IACHR, in contrast, require plaintiffs to attempt adjudication
in a domestic court. A plaintiff consequently would have to wait approximately a decade in the ECHR and the IACHR, as well as any additional time
it would have taken for the domestic court to have reached a decision that is
final enough for the ECHR and IACHR to accept jurisdiction. Therefore, in
consideration of the overall length of adjudication, a plaintiff may prefer to
limit his claims to a suit in United States courts.
3. Compensation

Even assuming that the plaintiff obtains a hearing before a regional
tribunal, he may receive little compensation for his efforts. The IACHR, for
example, rarely awards more than $10,000 in financial compensation.149 The
expenses undertaken by the Commission for transportation and accommodations for witnesses and experts (estimated at tens of thousands of dollars)150
may not justify adjudication of international human rights claims in the
IACHR. On the other hand, while ATCA suits have awarded plaintiffs
massive damages, 5' the plaintiffs rarely have been able to collect the awards
from foreign defendants.' 52 Nevertheless, the ability to collect damages from

146

id.

'41

See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.

148

See supra note 143 and accompanying text.

149Id.

150Id.
'"'

For example, the plaintiffs in Filartiga recovered $10 million in punitive damages.

Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860, 867 (D.C.N.Y. 1984).
152 Lobe, supra note 7.
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American multinational corporations with bases in the United States likely will
be less difficult than collecting damages from foreign defendants. Even
foreign multinational corporations have complied with the award of damages
under ATCA suits.153 Due to the greater likelihood of collecting major
damages from American multinational corporations, a plaintiff may choose to
bring his claim under the ATCA.
B. Regional Tribunals' Limiting Principles
The initial statistics already are daunting; the systems further enforce
several major principles that emphasize deference to the decisions of domestic
authorities. The theories adopted by the ECHR and the IACHR are the
principle of subsidiarity, the margin of appreciation doctrine, and the fourth
instance formula. Under these doctrines, a plaintiff seeking relief for
international human rights violations has an incentive to seek effective
domestic remedy. Adjudication of ATCA claims in U.S. courts, particularly
for claims against American multinational corporations, may be appropriate
and even advisable. This Part will examine the theories of deference applied
by the regional tribunals, and ultimately conclude that the existence of regional
tribunals should not necessarily preclude adjudication of international human
rights claims in domestic courts, specifically litigation in U.S. courts under the
ATCA.
1. The Principleof Subsidiarity
Under the principle of subsidiarity, the role of international authorities in
the resolution of human rights claims is subordinate to the role of domestic
bodies.' 54 The ECHR explained its role as follows:
[T]he machinery of protection established by the [European]
Convention is subsidiary to the national systems safeguarding
human rights. The Convention leaves to each Contracting State,
in the first place, the task of securing the rights and freedoms it

...Victims of the Nazi Holocaust successfully sued foreign companies and banks under the
ATCA, alleging torts due to the businesses' rejection of the victims' money or insurance claims
following World War II. Id. Swiss banks actually negotiated a settlement worth $1.2 billion.
Id.
' See generally Costa, supra note 89, at 456 (defining the principle of subsidiarity).
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The institutions created by it make their own

contribution to this task but they become involved only through
contentious proceedings and once all domestic remedies have
been exhausted ....1

The ECHR primarily reviews the appropriateness of the procedures utilized
by domestic legal systems, rather than the substantive rights guaranteed by
such systems.1 56 In several cases, the ECHR has found violations of Article 2
of the European Convention, which ensures the right to life, not on the
substantive issue, but rather on the procedural aspect. 1 '
Thus, under the principle of subsidiarity, the regional tribunals strictly
evaluate the domestic proceedings, avoiding a review of the substantive law
of each state. Moreover, a domestic court in a non-democratic state is not
required to provide all of the rights guaranteed in a democratic state. A
plaintiff consequently would have a better chance of success in a state that
offered more human rights; he therefore has an incentive to seek domestic
relief in a democratic state such as the United States, instead of relief in the
state in which the human rights violations occurred. This is particularly true
because in third category ATCA claims, the government often committed the
actual human rights violations. 5
2. The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine

Under the margin of appreciation doctrine applied by the European system
of human rights, member states retain a "margin of appreciation" in applying
certain European Convention provisions to their particular circumstances.' 59
The doctrine specifically acknowledges that "each society is entitled to certain
rights and
latitude in resolving the inherent conflicts between individual
' 60
convictions."'
moral
different
among
national interests or
The European Convention's lack of a specific list of protected rights and
freedoms is an example of the application of the margin of appreciation

"' Handyside v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5493/72, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 737, 753 (1976)

(court decision) (citation omitted).

156 Costa, supra note 89, at 458.

157Id. at 459.
158 See supra note 36.

9 Eyal Benvenisti, Marginof Appreciation,Consensus, and UniversalStandards,31 N.Y.U.
J. INT'L L. & POL. 843, 843 (1999).

160Id. at 843-44.

ATCA SUITS: THE BETTER ALTERNATIVE

2005]

doctrine. 61 The European human rights system generally emphasizes the
protection of civil and political rights.'6 2 Scholars conclude that the sole
purpose of the European Convention is to define the central, fundamental
values of democracy.' 63 Despite the fact that subsequent protocols to the
European Convention have introduced some measure of economic, social, and
cultural rights, the member states are hesitant to further expand the original
list. 64 The states' reluctance demonstrates their recognition of, and respect
for, the differences in wealth, culture, and history of the various member
65
states.1
Essentially, the European human rights system does not impose universal
responsibilities upon member states of the European Convention.66 As a
result, decisions of the ECHR do not have the same force of law as decisions
of the domestic courts of the member states. Each member state instead must
expressly implement the decisions of the ECHR by executing legislation
codifying those decisions. Where a member state refuses to comply with the
decision of the ECHR, the European Convention does not provide for
enforcement. 167 Nonetheless, the ECHR may request a member state to offer
an "explanation of the manner in which
its internal law ensures the effective
68
implementation" of ECHR decisions.
Therefore, while the ECHR has some authority to promote the ideals of the
European Convention, the Convention also grants member states a degree of
latitude in the integration of human rights ideals into the states' individual
legal and judicial structures. 169 Moreover, the European Convention does not
obligate a particular member state to adopt the decisions of the ECHR to which
the state is not a party. Thus, as a result of the margin of appreciation doctrine,
national courts are not directly bound by decisions of the ECHR.
In sum, under the margin of appreciation doctrine, the regional tribunals
will respect the internal cultural and moral values in individual member states.
Again, the plaintiff seeking domestic relief for human rights violations would
have a better likelihood of success in a stable democratic state because the

161Costa, supra note 89, at 458.
162

id.

161 Id. at

458.

Id. at 459.
165 Id.
'6'

166

Id. at 460.

167 European Convention, supra note 88, art. 60, 213 U.N.T.S. at 250.
161 Id. art. 57, 213 U.N.T.S. at 250.
161 See id.
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state would be able to offer a greater range of human rights guarantees. Nondemocratic states, especially those under military rule, could not provide the
same measure of economic, social, and cultural rights.
3. The Fourth Instance Formula
The fourth instance formula continues the deferential treatment of domestic
court decisions evident in the principle of subsidiarity and the margin of
appreciation doctrine. The formula prohibits a regional tribunal from acting
as a domestic appellate court in its review of the decisions of domestic
courts. 70 The Vice President of the ECHR observed the difficult procedural
barriers presented by an attempt at appellate review:
[The ECHR] cannot rehear cases in the same way as a national
court; it cannot examine facts, evidence, and legal issues in the
same sort of detail as a national court.... [N]ational authorities
and the judiciary are in a better position-because of their local
knowledge, expertise, and the relative rapidity with which they
can intervene-to make accurate assessments of facts and law
and guarantee the most effective protection of individual
171
rights.
The ECHR thus dismisses claims in which a plaintiff asserts that a domestic
court misinterpreted domestic law or made inappropriate findings of fact,
unless the plaintiff is able to prove that the domestic proceedings clearly
violated a right protected by the European Convention. 72 The fourth instance
formula followed by the LACHR essentially parallels the formula promulgated
by the ECHR.' 73

170

See generallyCosta, supra note 89, at 457 (describing the ECHR's adoption of the fourth

instance formula).
171 Id.; see also Edwards v. U.K., 247 Eur. Ct. H.R. 23 (ser. A) 23 (1992) (holding that the
ECHR assesses the fairness of the proceeding, and does not re-assess findings of fact and
determinations of domestic law made by a domestic court).
172 See generally Costa, supra note 89, at 457 (explaining the ECHR's application of the
fourth instance formula); Diego Rodriguez Pinzon, The "Victim" Requirement, the Fourth
Instance Formulaand the Notion of "Person" in the Individual Complaint Procedureof the
Inter-American Human Rights System, 7 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 369, 376-80 (2001)
(delineating the ECHR's formulation of the fourth instance formula).
173 See generallyPinzon, supra note 172, at 376-77 (comparing the fourth instance formula
utilized by the IACHR with the formula developed by the European system). In Marzioni v.
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Therefore, under both the European and Inter-American systems of human
rights, the fourth instance formula serves as further support for the proposition
that international human rights mechanisms operate on a lesser or equivalent,
but not superior, level to domestic authorities responsible for human rights
protection.174 The formula emphasizes the regional tribunals' deferential
treatment of human rights determinations made by domestic bodies.
The fourth instance formula has received some criticism, however. Critics
contend that the formula imposes a "double standard"'75 because the strictness
or leniency with which a regional tribunal will apply the formula depends upon
the nature of a state's government.' 76 The Inter-American human rights system
in particular, due to the various stages of democracy achieved by its member
states, generally has subjected judiciary decisions issued in democratic
member states to lesser scrutiny than the decisions issued in authoritarian
member states.' 77
On one hand under the fourth instance formula, the regional tribunals
acknowledge the procedural and practical limitations preventing full appellate
review of domestic decisions. On the other hand, the IACHR generally
subjects the decisions of domestic courts in authoritarian states to a heightened
level of scrutiny. Assuming that the plaintiff seeks efficient resolution of his
human rights claims, he consequently has an incentive to avoid adjudicating
his claims in a non-democratic state. Otherwise, he risks becoming a victim
of the decade-long review process of the IACHR.

Argentina, the IACHR stated:
The Commission's task is to ensure the observance of the obligations

undertaken by the States parties to the [American] Convention, but it cannot
serve as an appellate court to examine alleged errors of internal law or fact
that may have been committed by the domestic courts acting within their

jurisdiction. Such examination would be in order only insofar as the mistakes
entailed a possible violation of any of the rights set forth in the Convention.
Case 11.673, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 76, OEA/ser. L./V.II.95, doc. 7 rev. (1986).
"' See generallyPinzon, supranote 172, at 379-80 (asserting that the fourth instance formula
derives from the international law principle that international human rights authorities are

complementary or subsidiary to domestic human rights bodies).
171Id.
176 See
177

at 373.
id.at 380.

See id. (explaining that "[iln a hemisphere where states with difficult levels of democratic

development exist ...the commission must use its mechanisms in a creative and effective way
to induce progress in the general human rights situation").
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C. Comparisonof the Regional and Domestic Systems
The examination of the principle of subsidiarity, margin of appreciation
doctrine, and fourth instance formula have particular relevance to this analysis.
As previously noted, the Inter-American human rights system offers the
primary regional tribunal available to plaintiffs in ATCA suits against
American multinational corporations. The procedural rules of the interAmerican system require a plaintiff to exhaust domestic remedies prior to
filing a claim with the Inter-American Commission. The double standard
imposed by the fourth instance formula especially affords a plaintiff an
incentive to adjudicate the human rights claims in a domestic court of the state
with the most stable system of democratic government.
Otherwise, if the plaintiff loses and must appeal to the IACHR, the plaintiff
then may become a victim of the Inter-American system's lengthy review
process. The plaintiff further may rationalize that adjudication in a democratic
state, with relatively consistent protection of human rights, likely will result
in a more efficient and favorable judgment on the merits, as well as appeal to
a U.S. appellate court.
Although review by the Inter-American Commission could be beneficial
to the plaintiff because he would be permitted two hearings--one before a
domestic tribunal and one before a regional tribunal-the process is duplicative, and in view of the general length of time it takes for the IACHR to receive
and hear a case, adjudication before a U.S. court would be more efficient.
Thus, under the fourth instance formula adopted by the ECHR and the
IACHR, and the double standard imposed by the IACHR in particular,
adjudication of human rights claims in U.S. courts under the ATCA may offer
a more attractive option to foreign plaintiffs asserting claims against American
multinational corporations.
IV. CONCLUSION

For almost two hundred years, the ATCA lay dormant; however, within a
period of approximately two decades, federal circuit courts have issued
revolutionary decisions that have expanded and developed the statute's
protection of human rights. Currently, three major types of ATCA claims are
available to victims of human rights abuses. In the first category, an alien
plaintiff may sue a foreign state actor such as a foreign government or its
officials for human rights violations committed in that foreign state. In the
second category, an alien plaintiff may sue a foreign non-state actor such as an
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individual or a corporation for human rights violations committed in a foreign
state. In the third category, an alien plaintiff may sue a multinational
corporation for human rights violations committed by a foreign host government, of which the multinational corporation had knowledge.
The third category has stimulated the most controversy as legal scholars
heatedly debate the appropriateness of adjudication of international human
rights violations in U.S. courts under the ATCA. Defendants in the third
category increasingly are American multinational corporations, and continued
litigation under the ATCA may have serious consequences for American trade
and investment. International business groups particularly have been
concerned about potential liability for overseas operations. The Bush
administration, likewise, has demonstrated concern about the effect of ATCA
litigation on U.S. foreign policy, should the litigation result in public criticism
of foreign states with which the United States has delicate relations.
In consideration of the continuing debate over the appropriateness of
adjudicating international human rights claims in U.S. courts under the ATCA,
this Note examined international human rights tribunals, in order to construct
a source of comparison for the determination of the most effective judicial
remedy for victims of human rights violations. The ECHR and the IACHR
constitute the oldest and most established regional human rights tribunals, and
this Note therefore analyzed of the structure, procedure, and principles of the
two tribunals. First, the massive backlog and incoming caseload currently
faced by those tribunals may encourage plaintiffs to seek relief in domestic
courts. Second, the lengthy processing of claims, which require analysis by the
commission and the courts, provide another incentive for plaintiffs to seek
domestic remedies. The European Convention and the American Convention
indeed require a prospective complainant to exhaust domestic remedies before
filing a claim with the respective commissions. Based on the above factors
alone, the plaintiff must seek domestic relief; he initially may turn to the
domestic courts of the state in which the alleged acts occurred.
However, further analysis of the principles adopted by the European and
Inter-American systems of human rights, specifically the principle of
subsidiarity, the margin of appreciation doctrine, and the fourth instance
formula, indicate that the plaintiff has an incentive to seek domestic relief in
a state with a stable democratic system of government. First, under the
principle of subsidiarity, the regional tribunals restrict the review of human
rights claims to an evaluation of the domestic proceedings. The tribunals
severely avoid review of the substantive law adopted by the state. Thus, the
domestic court in a non-democratic state is not required to provide all of the
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substantive rights guaranteed in a democratic state. A plaintiff has a better
chance of success in a state that offers more human rights; he therefore has an
incentive to seek domestic relief in a democratic state such as the United
States, instead of in the state in which the human rights violations occurred.
This is particularly true because in third category ATCA claims, the state
government often committed the actual human rights violations.
Second, the margin of appreciation doctrine supports the deferential
treatment of domestic decisions introduced by the principle of subsidiarity.
This doctrine emphasizes respect for the internal cultural and moral values in
individual member states. For example, the European Convention protects
fundamental civil and political rights, but generally permits the member states
to determine economic, social, and cultural rights. Again, a plaintiff seeking
domestic relief for human rights violations is more likely to succeed in a stable
democratic state because it can offer a greater range of human rights guarantees. Non-democratic states, especially those under military rule, do not
provide the same measure of economic, social, and cultural rights and under
the margin of appreciation doctrine an international tribunal will not impose
a higher measure.
Finally, the fourth instance formula, particularly the double standard
imposed by the IACHR, offers further support for the adjudication of human
rights violations in U.S. courts under the ATCA. Under the fourth instance
formula, the regional tribunals acknowledge the procedural and practical
limitations that prevent full appellate review of domestic decisions. On the
other hand, the IACHR generally subjects the decisions of domestic courts in
authoritarian states to a more heightened level of scrutiny. Assuming that the
plaintiff seeks efficient resolution of his human rights claims, he consequently
has an incentive to avoid adjudicating his claims in a non-democratic state.
Otherwise, if the plaintiff loses his case and must appeal to the IAHCR, he
risks becoming a victim of the decade-long review process of that court. In
contrast, a plaintiff before a U.S. court may appeal to a U.S. appellate court,
likely resulting in a more efficient resolution of his case.
Therefore, the principle of subsidiarity, margin of appreciation doctrine,
and fourth instance formula adopted by the ECHR and the IACHR provide
victims of human rights violations an incentive to adjudicate their claims in
U.S. courts. Because of the lack of a more efficient or available alternative,
adjudication of human rights violations in U.S. courts under the ATCA is an
appropriate and even necessary use of judicial power.

